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OFFERINGS WITH RIGHTS
EVIDENCE FROM THE SWISS MARKET
Abstract
We examine the long-run performance of firms that offer seasoned equity on
the Swiss market. Swiss firms use offerings with rights to raise new equity and
they can issue three types of securities. Moreover, the tax law has for some firms
the effect of increasing the issuing frequency. We find that most SEOs are small
as a percentage of the firm’s market capitalisation. The leverage ratios change
often (up and down) during a three-period post-SEO horizon. The long-run
abnormal returns are insignificant relative to size and book-to-market matching
portfolios. These findings are corroborated by the fact that a portfolio of issuing
firms do not exhibit a risk adjusted (Fama and French three factor model and
Time-varying beta) abnormal performance. These findings are in accordance with
the growing literature showing that the US SEOs do no more have abnormal
negative performance. Finally, we show that Swiss firms have an incentive to use
SEOs as a substitute to stock dividends. This particular feature help to explain the
high frequency of SEOs in Switzerland before 1992.
JEL classification : G14, G32EEXECUTIVEXECUTIVE  SUMMARYSUMMARY
There is mixed empirical evidence  about the  long-run stock performance
following a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO). The first results found on the US
market are puzzling. They show that firms raising new capital under-perform
over long periods of time firms that do not. However, a growing literature
mitigates the interpretation of these results and focuses on mispricing problems.
The aim of this research is to examine the influence of the institutional context on
the motive of a firm to issue equity and, consequently, on the long-run stock
performance. We study the SEOs made by Swiss firms between 1982 and 1994.
The Swiss legal environment valid until 1992 had direct implications on the
role  and  the  frequency  of  equity  issues.   Stock  dividends  were  taxed  as
cash dividends at a withholding rate of 35 % while capital gains were free of
taxes. Therefore, some Swiss firms had a strong incentive to offer new stocks at a
very discounted price instead of stock dividends. In that sense, an equity issue
was no longer an instrument of the financing policy but a part of the dividend
policy. We call these denatured offerings "quasi SEOs".
For the trade-off between SEOs and stock dividends to be profitable, firms that
issue equity should not under-perform firms that do not. We measure the 3-year
post-SEO abnormal stock performance of issuing firms according to several
benchmarks (portfolio of matching firms and beta pricing models). In support of
our hypothesis, we find no under-performance. Furthermore, several
characteristics of the offerings give credit to the "quasi SEOs" argument. First,
the issuing price discount is large (46 % of the market price) which ensures the
shareholder to make an important capital gain if he sells his new stock. Second,
the size of the offering is small (less than 10 % of the market value of the firm
in contrast to 15 % in the US and 20 % in France). Therefore, the amount raised
would not be sufficient to finance investment projects and not large enough togenerate free cash flow problems. Finally, the issuing frequency is high (2 or 3
offerings within a 3-year period). This periodicity mimics dividends distribution.
Since 1992, the stock dividends have been much less taxed and the characteristics
of Swiss SEOs have become comparable to international standards. Our main
conclusion is that the institutional context can alter the signification or function of
a particular financial operation. This implies that the firm's motive behind one
specific event is not homogenous across different institutional environments.
Therefore, one should always have these considerations in mind while explaining
the impact of an event on the firm's value.1
THE LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF SEASONED EQUITY
OFFERINGS WITH RIGHTS
EVIDENCE FROM THE SWISS MARKET
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Several empirical studies on long-run stock performance following a seasoned
equity offering (SEO) have been made in the United States but few in Europe
where the market conditions and the legal environment are very different.
American firms long-run reaction to SEO is indeed significantly negative over a
3- or 5-year horizon after the issue (see Eckbo and Masulis, 1995, p. 1044;
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). Even when bonds
or convertible bonds are issued, the same negative stock price reaction is
underlined (see Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999). These findings are puzzling
for at least two reasons. First, it is surprising that firms conducting a SEO use the
proceeds in a way that penalises the investors. Second and more important, it is
inconceivable that the latter would still subscribe to the offer knowing these
conditions. Information asymmetry could explain part of the underperformance.
The new shares are bought by investors who could be less informed than
managers or existing shareholders. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) show that
managers have a tendency to manipulate intermediate corporate earnings
(accruals in particular) before the SEO in such a way that the issuing price is
overvalued, this overvaluation being corrected gradually during the three
following years. One could expect the correction delay to be shorter.
A growing literature mitigates the interpretation of the results found in the
previous studies. The critics focus on mispricing problems and can be classified
in the following categories : time aggregation of abnormal returns, pricing model
specification and time dependence of the events. First, two classical techniques
are employed to cumulate abnormal returns on the long-run, namely the2
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the buy and hold abnormal returns
(BHAR). However, both of them lead to statistical problems. Cumulating one-
period returns over a long time interval induces a positive or negative bias due to
measurement errors of the observed returns (see Conrad and Kaul, 1993; Barber
and Lyon, 1997). The use of BHAR can reduce this bias. On the other hand,
BHAR are subject to severe inference problems in statistical tests (see Barber and
Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997).
Second, the results of long-run event studies are highly sensitive to the model
specification and especially to the selected benchmark (see Mitchell and Stafford,
1998). For instance, the use of Fama and French’s three-factor model in
conjunction with value-weighted returns eliminates the abnormal performance
(see Brav, Geczy and Gompers, 2000). Small and low book-to-market firms
contribute to most of the underperformance which can be reduced with value
weighting. However, according to Jegadeesh (1997), only book-to-market is able
to explain the anomaly.
Finally, the events are not independent from each other and from the calendar
time. The use of a benchmark that allows for a time varying risk premium
suppresses the abnormal performance (see Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2000).
Furthermore, the abnormal performance becomes insignificant for firms
conducting subsequent SEOs (see Brav, Geczy and Gompers, 2000).
What comes out of the literature on long-run performance is that it does not
exist a unique methodology able to give proper results. In fact, the models used to
detect abnormal performance do not specify well the alternative hypothesis to no
abnormal performance. Therefore, this misspecification of the models could not
lead to market efficiency rejection. In a recent paper, Fama (1998) argues that if
some event studies exhibit long-run abnormal returns, it is not due to market
inefficiency to integrate all information in the stock prices but to what he calls3
“chance”. If we consider a large set of events the firm is subject to, apparent
over-reaction of stock prices is about as common as under-reaction. Furthermore,
post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as
post-event reversal. According to Fama, most of the anomalies tend to disappear
with reasonable technical changes.
If we look closely at the empirical work that has been done on the stock
performance, no events systematically show an abnormal reaction of the same
sign. For instance, even if the average abnormal returns are negative on the long-
run for SEOs, a significant number of firms exhibit a positive performance. In
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), 40 % of the SEO sample companies
outperform their benchmark after three years. Similar proportions are reported in
Affleck-Graves and Page (1996) and in Levis (1995) for related events.
Previous studies restrict their validity to one institutional setting, that is the
United States. The aim of this research is to explore the long-run performance of
SEO in a different legal environment. The Swiss legal system is a mix between
civil and common law that ensures less protection to shareholders than in the
United States (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1997).
However, in the case of SEO, the law enforces the firms to issue equity with
subscription rights. This procedure prevent capital dilution and let the shareholder
manage his voting rights dilution. The informational gap between issuers and
buyers is reduced because they are mainly both insiders. Therefore, the long-run
stock performance could be influenced by the stocks issuing process. The
empirical evidence is more complex: Kang, Kim and Stultz (1999) do not find
abnormal performance for SEOs with rights in Japan while  Affleck-Graves and
Page (1996) show that the converse is true in South Africa. An implication of the
Swiss legal system is the very extensive banking system. Actually, bank loans
constitute the main source of firms’ external financing. Banks play an important4
role in monitoring and they are entirely part of the security market. Second, Swiss
firms can issue three types of securities (two voting shares and one non-voting).
For each new SEO, subscription rights are given to all existing shareholders
whatever the type of the offered shares. Third, as dividends are highly taxed
when capital gains are not, the Swiss tax law has a direct influence on the firms
frequency to issue equity as well as on the purpose of the offering.
As shown by Loderer and Zimmermann (1988), the performance of Swiss
firms after a SEO is rather positive. Moreover, the abnormal performance after
one year is not identical for all types of securities. However, because of the short
sample period, they are unable to find any statistically significant evidence of
long-run abnormal performance. On the other hand, Caramanolis, Gibson and
Tuchschmid (1996) examine the short-run stock price reaction to SEO
announcement. They do not detect any significant abnormal reaction when all
security types are aggregated. Though, the results become also significantly
positive for one of the voting shares when analysed separately.
These preliminary remarks underline the interest that we find in undertaking a
study on the neutrality of subscription rights in long-run SEO stock performance.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow : in section 2, we describe
more deeply the Swiss institutional context. We present and analyse the sample
of SEO firms in section 3. The portfolio matching methodology and the empirical
results are exposed in section 4. In Section 5, we check the robustness of the
results by using a risk-based alternative. Finally, we present our conclusions in
section 6.5
2. The Swiss institutional context 2. The Swiss institutional context
2.1. The issuing process
In Switzerland, two issuing methods are employed to raise equity in cash. The
first one is the ordinary seasoned equity offering. The shareholders’ general
meeting decides to raise equity at the absolute majority. The decision includes the
number of new shares to be issued, the face value, the type(s) of securities, the
issuing price and the subscription rights. The board of directors publish an
issuance report with all the SEO modalities. It is important to remark that the law
does not require to communicate the use of the proceeds. The offering is then
realised and a final report is edited. The whole procedure has to be done in the
three months following the general meeting’s decision. The second method, the
authorised offering, allows the board of directors to raise equity within the next
two years according to the rules defined in the company’s status (i.e., the total
amount to be raised). Then, the board is free to decide how and when to proceed
to the SEO. In fact, it could even conduct several “smaller” SEOs during the 2-
year period. The total amount raised in an authorised offering can not exceed half
of the existing equity book value.
Both issuance processes are accompanied with subscription rights. These rights
are used so that, if the existing shareholder wants it, his stake in the firm’s capital
could be left unchanged both for his proportion in the balance of votes and for his
proportional right to corporate earnings. Therefore, subscription rights protect
existing shareholders against capital dilution. These prescriptions should prevent
any change in the shareholders’ wealth. When the rights are issued, the existing
shareholders have about a week to decide if they want to take part in the offering
or sell their rights to outside investors. Within this week, the rights can be traded
freely on the market.6
2.2. The type of shares
Swiss firms have the possibility to issue and list three types of securities when
they raise equity. Two of them are voting shares (registered shares, R; bearer
shares, B) and the third is non-voting (participation certificates, PC). All three
kinds give the right to their holders to receive a dividend and though they are
considered as equity. The law states a clear distinction between the voting shares
and the non-voting one. In the balance sheet, the total face value of PC equity has
to be separated from the aggregated one of the two other equity forms.
Furthermore, the total face value of PC cannot exceed twice the one of bearer and
registered shares altogether. On the other hand, no distinction is made in the other
equity accounts.
Before the 90’s, Swiss firms used the different types of securities as a way to
limit take-over threats. The firm had the possibility to refuse the transfer of its
registered shares to undesirable investors, with some restrictions and within a
certain lapse of time. As his name had to be registered in the shareholders’
record, the owner of a registered share was known by the firm at any time. In
fact, the company had the right to deny the transfer until the buyer had proved to
have acquired the stocks in his own name and for his own need. As long as the
buyer was not accepted, the seller kept all the property and participation rights
(legal interdiction of dividing). The firm could also refuse to acknowledge a buyer
when a maximum number of registered shares, defined in the firm’s status, was
overtaken. In this case, the buyer had yet all the rights attached to his shares
except for the voting right and he should be registered in the record as a non-
voting shareholder. Since the late 80’s, most of the firms have started open their
registered equity to foreigners but it had sometimes a deep impact on the stock
price (see Loderer and Jacobs, 1995; Stultz and Wasserfallen, 1995).7
If registered shares succeed in keeping the control of the firm in “safe” hands,
they are not sufficient to cover the firm’s need in equity financing. Therefore,
bearer shares can be issued. They are in fact common shares. The owner is the
one who holds the stock and the firm has no control or power over him. This form
of security is typically useful to let foreigners and pension funds invest in the
firm.
Until the introduction of the new corporate law in July 1992, both voting
shares had a minimum legal face value of CHF 100. Consequently, the market
price was high and could prevent some investors to buy the stock. In order to
bypass this problem, firms issued low face value participation certificates which
had no legal status under the old corporate law. This type of security was mainly
used in the 80’s. The legal differences between security types were reduced in
1992 and most of the PCs were converted into either one or the other voting
shares. Nowadays, most of the firms have one type of security (bearer or
registered) in their capital structure.
Each form of security addresses itself to specific investors. This helps to
explain why previous studies were sensitive to the type of securities (see Loderer
and Zimmermann, 1988; Caramanolis, Gibson and Tuchschmid, 1996). The fact
that Swiss firms can be multi-security types firms has one more implication on the
design of our study. The post-event performance has to be analysed at two
different levels. First, we observe the individual stock price reaction to SEO and
second we examine the performance of the firm that raises equity. In that sense, a
firm is considered as a multi-security portfolio: for each firm, we form a value-
weighted portfolio of the different types of shares outstanding. In other countries,
the stock price reaction is identical to and not separable from the firm’s
performance.8
2.3. Tax considerations
Swiss legal characteristics may have at least two direct implications on the
companies’ motives to proceed to several subsequent SEOs in a rather short time
interval. The first implication is related to the possible trade-off between capital
gains non-taxation and dividend taxation. Cash payments (i.e. dividend payment)
to shareholders are taxed at a withholding rate of 35 % while capital gains are
free of taxes. Until the introduction of the new corporate law, stock dividends
were considered by the law as cash payments and consequently taxed. In that
sense, there was a strong incentive to issue new stocks at a very discounted price
instead of paying stock dividends. Of course for this procedure to be worth doing,
SEO should have no negative abnormal impact on the stock price. Since July
1992, stock dividends are no longer considered as cash payments. Nevertheless,
the face value of the new stocks is still taxed at 35 %. Therefore, the advantage to
conduct a SEO instead of distributing stock dividends has been strongly reduced.
The second legal implication has to do with the high minimum legal face value
of voting shares before July 1992. Because the minimum value is quickly
reached, stock splits have a very limited power in lowering the stock price level.
In that case, SEO can be used as a substitute. This effect -Bigelli (1998) calls it
the “quasi-split effect”- is more effective when the issuing price is low. If Swiss
firms conduct SEOs to benefit from the quasi-split effect, we should observe the
same stock price reaction as for stock splits. Again, the new corporate law which
has strongly lowered the minimum face value, mitigates the appealing of such a
strategy. Hence, since 1993, we observe a large increase in the number of
conventional splits with no abnormal price reaction around the announcement
date (see Dubois and Russi, 1993) and a low number of SEO each year.9
3. Description of the data 3. Description of the data
3.1. The SEO market in Switzerland
The data on the SEOs are collected from the “Offizielle Zeitschrift der Zürcher
Börse” and from the “Guide Suisse des Actions” starting from January 1982 to
December 1997. Table 1 presents the figures about the number of firms that raise
equity, the number of SEOs and the number of operations on stocks.
As one SEO could involve more than one type of shares, we define an
operation on stock as the issuance of one type of shares. During the total period,
104 firms conduct 249 SEOs (firm sample) or 379 operations on stocks (stock
sample).




Number of SEO firms 104           65      (62.5%) 39      (37.5%)
Number of SEOs 249           84      (33.7%) 165      (66.3%)
Number of operations on stocks 379           118      (31.1%) 261      (68.9%)
1982 - 86
Number of SEO firms 55           18      (32.7%) 37      (67.3%)
Number of SEOs 101           20      (19.8%) 81      (80.2%)
Number of operations on stocks 147           29      (19.7%) 118      (80.3%)
1987 - 92
Number of SEO firms 73           36      (49.3%) 37      (50.7%
Number of SEOs 119           45      (37.8%) 74      (62.2%)
Number of operations on stocks 198           68      (34.3%) 130      (65.7%)
1993 - 97
Number of SEO firms 28           19      (67.9%) 9      (32.1%)
Number of SEOs 29           19      (65.5%) 10      (34.5%)
Number of operations on stocks 34           21      (61.8%) 13      (38.2%)
firms with firms with
less than 3 SEOs 3 or more SEOs
We distinguish the numbers of SEO firms, offerings and operations on stocks because one firm can issue equity
several times over the period and can offer up to three different types of securities. Firms with less than 3 SEOs
over the period are considered as low issuing frequency firms opposite to high issuing frequency firms that do 3
or more SEOs. The firm’s issuing frequency is determined over the 1982-1997 period and not for each sub-
period.
We find that 37.5% of the issuers make about 66% of the offerings. Some
Swiss firms proceed to three or more SEOs over the total period. During the first10
two sub-periods (1982-86 and 1987-92), these high issuing frequency firms are
doing a large majority of the events. The proportion falls dramatically in the latest
period (1993-97) after the introduction of the new corporate law. However, for all
the periods, the percentage of operations on stocks made by high issuers is very
similar to the percentage of SEOs, which is not a surprise.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, most of the offerings take place between
1985 and 1990. This observation is valid for all the security types, although the
PC high issuing period is more concentrated (from 1985 to 1987). Bearer shares
are the most commonly issued stocks (162 offerings or 43 % of the stock
sample). They are followed by registered shares (111 offerings or 29 %) and PCs
(106 offerings or 28 %). In 1988, the number of PC offerings decreases severely
to almost zero. In fact, after 1992, most of the firms have converted this type of
security into one of the voting shares.
The distribution of the SEOs throughout the year is concentrated between May
and September because shareholders’ general meetings are normally held in
April, May or sometimes June. As 90 % of the SEOs are ordinary offerings, they
are expected to be done in the three-month period following the general meeting’s
decision.
As most of the US studies do not include the financial firms, we separate them
from the non-financial companies. We observe that financial firms (SF) are
relatively active in issuing equity (87 offerings, 36 % of the total).11
Table 2 : Description of the Swiss seasoned equity offerings 1982–1997 Table 2 : Description of the Swiss seasoned equity offerings 1982–1997






Panel A : Number of SEOs
1982 3 5 3 11 2 4 6
1983 5 3 3 11 7 4 11
1984 9 7 5 21 6 7 13
1985 20 13 21 54 20 13 33
1986 18 14 18 50 22 16 38
1987 22 13 25 60 25 12 37
1988 13 10 4 27 12 5 17
1989 25 12 9 46 22 5 27
1990 16 11 3 30 13 4 17
1991 8 5 5 18 9 2 11
1992 6 6 5 17 5 5 10
1993 4 3 2 9 5 1 6
1994 2 2 0 4 2 2 4
1995 3 1 0 4 2 1 3
1996 4 1 1 6 3 3 6
1997 4 5 2 11 7 3 10
Total 162 111 106 379 162 87 249
Panel B: Size of the offerings in % of the market value of equity
1982 - 1997
average % 16 12 22 16 22 11 18
median % 8 6 9 7 11 6 9
1982 - 1986
average % 14 6 27 16 27 9 19
median % 5 5 12 7 14 4 8
1987 - 1992
average % 16 14 18 16 20 9 17
median % 9 6 11 8 10 7 9
1993 - 1997
average % 17 20 19 18 16 25 19
median % 10 13 18 12 13 11 13
We analyse both stock and firm samples. The stock sample is split into three security types sub-samples (bearer,
B; registered, R; and participation certificates, PC). The firm sample is split into two firm activity sub-samples
(Non-financial, NF and financial F). The last column of the stock and the firm samples (“all”) present the
figures about the “all stocks” and “all firms” samples. The size of the offerings is computed by dividing the
total amount raised by the market value of equity prior to the SEO. Median size is more representative because
average size is strongly influenced by few very large offerings.12
Another important characteristic of the Swiss SEOs is their small relative size.
In order to calculate the relative size, we divide the SEO proceeds by the pre-
event market capitalisation of either the stock or the firm. Figures about the SEO
size are shown in Panel B of Table 2. The median relative size is equal to 7 % for
the stock sample and 9 % for the firm sample. For instance, the median size is
about 15 % in the United States and 21 % in France. SEOs are larger for non
financial firms (11 % at the firm level) and quite smaller for financial companies
(only 6 %). As for the number of offerings, we observe a large change in the
1993-97 sub-period where the median size is always above 10 %. With the new
corporate law, the number of SEOs decreases and their size increases. This
evolution is especially important for the financial companies that represent 42 %
of the high issuers. PC is the type of security for which the relative size is the
larger. This could be expected because PCs were typically a 80’s phenomenon
and several firms issued them extensively
2.
During the sixteen-year period, 39 among the 104 firms proceed to at least
three offerings and up to seven (two firms). In Panel A of Table 3, we observe
that the median relative size of the SEOs decreases when the issuing frequency
increases.
High frequency issuers are larger firms. Their median market capitalisation
ranges from 336 millions of CHF to 902 millions. On the other hand, size of the
low frequency issuers is under 200 millions. Book-to-market median ratios of
SEO firms do not vary too much according to the issuing frequency. Growth or
maturity matter does not seem to be a factor influencing the firm’s frequency to
issue equity. In Panel B of Table 3, we categorise the number of SEOs according
to the issuing frequency and to the size of the offering. Most of the SEOs belongs
                                                       
2 Pirelli’s (1983), Nestlé’s (1985), Adia’s (1986) and Berner Holding’s (1987) offerings of participation
certificates were larger than 100 % of the pre-event market value.13
to the two smaller size classes (0 % to 15 %). Some very large offerings appear in
the high frequency classes and upwardly bias the average size. This consideration
justifies the use of the medians in our descriptive statistics.
Table 3 : Firm’s frequency to issue equity and size of the offering Table 3 : Firm’s frequency to issue equity and size of the offering
Number of SEOs conducted by a firm
one two three four five six or more all sample
Panel A : Characteristics of the SEO firms
number of SEO firms 46 19 12 14 7 6 104
average size of the SEO (%) 22.12 14.33 12.58 16.41 16.06 26.06 18.02
median size of the SEO (%) 13.59 10.48 8.80 7.96 4.57 7.00 8.68
SEO firms median size in
millions of CHF
164.90 194.25 354.47 335.97 671.90 902.20 353.60
SEO firms median book-to-
market
0.85 0.61 0.74 0.54 0.56 0.63 0.62
SEOs average amount raised in
millions of CHF
59.36 64.25 38.70 48.56 112.26 136.30 64.42
Firms average amount raised in
millions of CHF
59.36 128.50 116.11 194.23 561.29 863.23 378.00
Panel B : Number of SEOs according to the size of the offering
Total
SEO smaller than 5 % 8 10 12 11 18 12 71
SEO between 5 % and 15 % 16 13 14 33 8 13 97
SEO between 15 % and 50 % 19 15 9 9 6 9 67
SEO larger than 50 % 3 0 1 3 3 4 14
SEO larger than 100 % 1 0 0 1 2 2 6
Total number of SEOs 46 38 36 56 35 38 249
The issuing frequency is analysed exclusively at the firm level. Size of the offering, size of the firm and book-
to-market ratio are therefore computed for the firm, represented by a value weighted multi-security type
portfolio. The SEOs average amount raised is the average raw amount raised in one offering. Firms average
amount raised is the average total amount raised by a firm (the sum of the offerings). The last column (“all”)
represents the “all firms” sample.14
3.2. SEO and changes in the financial leverage
In order to estimate the relative importance of SEOs on the capital structure,
we examine the changes in the leverage ratio
3 of the SEO firms. Results are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4 : Changes in the leverage ratio of the SEO firms Table 4 : Changes in the leverage ratio of the SEO firms
0%-5% 5%-15% 15%-50% 50%-100% > 100%   Total %
Absolute changes in leverage ratio of SEO firms
number of firms 34    50    56    28    14    182    100.00 
median relative size of the 
SEO (%) 3.27    6.93    10.55    10.44    5.99   
median market value in 
millions CHF 1115    658    534    468    370   
Seo firms which leverage ratio increases
number of firms 16    20    17    16    14    83    45.60 
median relative size of the 
SEO (%) 2.49    8.18    6.92    9.43    5.99   
median market value in 
millions CHF 1572    658    468    1038    370   
Seo firms which leverage ratio decreases
number of firms 17    30    39    12    0    98    53.85 
median relative size of the 
SEO (%) 4.14    6.57    11.08    14.71   
median market value in 
millions CHF 1001    651    553    260   
Rate of changes in leverage ratio
The leverage ratio is the book value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total equity. The rate of
change in the leverage ratio is the difference between the leverage ratios in year t-1 and in year t. The relative
size of the SEO represents the total amount raised divided by the market value of equity prior to the offering.
Banks and insurance companies are not included in the SEO firms sample because their leverage ratio is not
clearly identifiable.
One could expect the leverage ratio to systematically decrease after a SEO.
Though, over 182 firms
4 for which data on leverage were available, we find that
for 83 companies the leverage ratio increases and it decreases for 98 firms. In
                                                       
3 We compute the leverage ratio by dividing the long-term debt by the equity book value. A change in the
leverage ratio is the variation between the pre-SEO fiscal year ratio and the one of the SEO fiscal year.
4 Banks and insurance companies are not included in this sample.15
more than 45 % of the cases, the issue is accompanied by an increase in the long-
term debt that is greater than the amount of money raised, at least in book value.
The median size of the offering increases with the absolute change in the leverage
ratio. This finding is still true when we separate the positive changes from the
negatives. It means that the larger the issue is, the larger the long-term debt
increase could be. From these considerations, it is clear that the main motivation
for doing a SEO is not re-balancing the capital structure by lowering leverage.
By examining the evolution of the leverage ratio over two periods (the SEO
fiscal year and the next fiscal year), we see that the firms financing policy is not
straightforward. A leverage ratio increase (up, U) in the first period could by
followed by either another increase (UU) or a decrease (UD) in the next period.
The same is true for a decrease in the first period (down, D, could lead to DU or
DD). The two-period evolution of leverage ratios are summarised in Table 5.
The 178 firms with full data availability are distributed almost uniformly across
the four possible evolution patterns. The percentage of reversals in leverage ratio
evolution is 46.63 % and continuation occurs in 53.37 % of the cases.
Table 5 : Changes in the leverage ratio from the SEO fiscal year to the next Table 5 : Changes in the leverage ratio from the SEO fiscal year to the next
UU UD DD DU Total reversals (%) continuations (%)
number of firms 38 44 45 51 178
percentage 21.35 24.72 25.28 28.65 100.00 53.37      46.63     
Leverage ratio changes of SEO firms are considered in the offering fiscal year and in the next fiscal year.
Positive changes are symbolised by a U for up and negative changes by a D for down. The UU column indicates
firms which leverage ratio increases in both SEO fiscal years and the following one. Reversal means that the
sign of the change in leverage ratio is modified from one year to the other. A continuation occurs when the sign
of the change is the same over the two years.
The evolution of the leverage ratio could be influenced if the same firm
conduct a SEO in two consecutive years. We denote 48 firms that do so and once
again we find no systematic relation, even if this time the percentage of
continuations is more important. The figures for the third period evolution of the
leverage ratios for our 2-consecutive-year SEO sample are at odds with those16
found after two periods: 45.83% are reversals and 54.17% are continuations. The
motivation of issuing equity at a high frequency is not a matter of repaying
outstanding debt.
3.3. The sample
For our descriptive statistics we have considered all the SEOs with rights made
by Swiss firms between 1982 and 1997. As we examine the stock performance
over a 36-month horizon after the SEO, we exclude from our samples the
offerings made within the last three years. The low number of SEO after the
introduction of the new Corporate Law (10 operations on firms during 93-94
against 220 for the 82-92 period) precludes a specific analysis of this sub-
samples. Because of high issuing frequency pattern, the long-run analysis of the
abnormal performance may become intricate. In fact, if equity issuance has any
long-run impact on stock prices, one event occurring in year 0 could influence the
performance of any overlapping offering realised by the same firm within the 36-
month horizon. After testing for overlapping impact, we find that it creates a
negative bias in the abnormal returns. However, the significance of the results
(not shown here, available from the authors upon request) is not affected. In order
to avoid overlapping problems, we take out of our samples every subsequent
offerings conducted within the analysis horizon. From our initial sample of 379
operations on stocks, we eliminate 21 operations that occur after 1994 and 128
operations because of overlapping. We are left with a “all stocks” sample of 230
observations. Following the same rationale, the “all firms” sample contains 135
out of the 249 offerings in the original sample (19 SEOs occur after 1994 and 95
are overlapping events).
Our analysis horizon has a maximum length of 36 months but we examine the
price reaction after 6, 12 and 24 months as well. Data about monthly stock prices,17
dividends and market prices are taken from Datastream
5. In addition, we ensure
that firms in our samples are listed for at least one year before the event. During
this pre-SEO period, 8 firms conduct an Initial Public Offering of a new security
type. We do not eliminate these companies because first, their number is very
small and second, the next SEO is done over all the outstanding types of
securities. When we build the firm multi-security portfolios, not taking into
account one of the security types would bias the selection of the control portfolio.
4. Is the performance abnormal after a SEO? 4. Is the performance abnormal after a SEO?
This section investigates the performance of firms and stocks after a SEO.
First, we present the methodology used to construct control portfolios. Second,
we define the measures used to test the null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance. Third, empirical results are presented for both the samples and sub-
samples.
4.1 The benchmark
As we have seen, the methodology used in order to detect the impact of a
specific event on the stock price has to be carefully designed. Instead of selecting
a matching firm as in Loughram and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Grave
(1995), we choose a control portfolio of firms (stocks) that are not subject to the
event. The rationale for that is to have a better matching for the SEO firms. In
fact, the Swiss stock market has a limited number of firms (stocks) and the
control portfolio is generally closer in terms of firm’s (stock) characteristics than
the matching firm (stock). Moreover, as large firms are often involved in SEO,
we avoid to take as control firms the few ones which do not realise this type of
                                                       
5 We are grateful to Dusan Isakov from HEC Genève for the access to the database.18
operation. The control portfolio is selected according to the size and book-to-
market ratio
6.
The methodology we use to select the control portfolio consists in minimising
the global distance between the SEO firm (stock) and the firms (stocks) in the
control portfolio according to a set of control variables. Jegadeesh (1997) uses a
similar method to select a matching firm. At the event month, we range the non
SEO firms (stocks) according to the matching criterion and we select the ten
firms (stocks) which are closest to the issuing stock (firm). When a firm (stock) is
delisted or engages itself in a SEO process, we switch it with the next closest firm
(stock) at the current month on a point forward basis. We do this procedure in
order to keep constant the number of firms (stocks) in the control portfolio. For a
given SEO, the distances are computed in event month 0. In order to measure the
closeness of two firms (stocks), we estimate the following distance :


















di is the Euclidian distance between the SEO firms (stocks) i and the control firm
(stock) c at event month 0;
Size is the market value of i (c) at time 0;
BM is the book-to-market of i (c) at time 0;
( )
2 2
BM Size s s  is the cross-sectional variance of the series of the variable Size (BM) at
time 0.
Each control variable is standardised in order give the same weight to both size
and the book-to-market. Book values are taken at the end of each fiscal year
                                                       
6 As in the US, size and book-to-market are variables that help explain stock returns in Switzerland (see Fama
and French, 1998).19
which occurs mostly in December. Book-to-market ratios are computed by
dividing the last year book value
7 (firm or stock) by the market value (stock or
firm) of the current month.
Following Loderer and Zimmermann (1988), we control for a share type effect
by analysing each type of shares separately. We split the “all stocks” sample into
three individual security sub-samples (bearer, registered and PC). The control
portfolio of a SEO specific type of shares only includes stocks of the same type
(i.e. the control portfolio of a SEO bearer share is formed exclusively with bearer
shares). The next characteristic we test is related to the firm activity. Our
motivation comes from the relative high number of financial firms that issue
equity on the Swiss market. From the “all firms” sample, we form two sub-
samples with “financial firms” and “non-financial firms”. As for the stock
sub-samples, control portfolio in the firm sub-samples are formed with firms of
the same activity. Because on average financial issuers conduct more SEOs of
smaller size than other firms, analysing them separately could lead to interesting
results. To summarise, we have four different samples at the stock level
(including the “all stocks” samples and three sub-samples) and three at the firm
level (including the “all firms” sample and two sub-samples).
4.2 Determining the abnormal performance
In spite of Conrad and Kaul (1993), we compute cumulative average monthly
abnormal returns in order to have a common base to compare our results with
previous studies. The average monthly adjusted returns (AARt) are calculated for
either 6, 12, 24 and 36 months after the seasoned equity offering as :
(2)  it CP it SEO t i R R AR , , , - =
                                                       
7 The book value of a stock is computed as follows. The total firm book value is split according to the type of










t i AR ,  is the abnormal return of the seasoned equity firm (stock) i in event month t;
it SEO R , is the return on seasoned equity firm (stock) i in event month t;
it CP R , is the return on the control portfolio of i over the same period;
t i w ,  is the weight of firm (stock) i in event month t;
t n  is the number of seasoned equity firms (stocks) in event month t.
Along this section, we construct an equally weighted and a value-weighted
portfolio. The weights are defined as follows:







i i i mv mv w
1
0 , 0 ,
where  0 , i mv is the size of the firm relative to the market.
We consider the market values at the time of the SEO otherwise the weights are
not independent from past returns. The cumulative average monthly adjusted
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8 The number of stocks (firms) is time-varying as some SEO stocks are delisted during the 36-month period. As
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) did, the holding-period returns of that firm (stock) and its matched portfolio
are truncated on the same day. However, this problem is of little concern because the very small number of
firms (stocks) delisted (2 firms over 135 and 12 stocks over 230).21
In order to analyse the exact influence of market conditions and firms
characteristics on the firm (stock) performance, the null hypothesis of no
abnormal returns is:
{ }months 36 , 24 , 12 , 6 where
0 :











Under the null, the standardised cumulated average abnormal returns adjusted for
cross-sectional variance and first order autocovaraince is distributed as Student-t
(see Ritter, 1991). A (non parametric) sign-test based on the proportion of
positive cumulated abnormal returns ( T i CAR , ) is presented to check the results.
We also compute the average buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR). We define
the holding period return for the stock (firm) i, from month 1 to month T as :
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Then the average buy and hold abnormal return is computed as :
(5) ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿
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where
it SEO R ,  is the return on seasoned equity firm (stock) i in event month t;
it CP R ,  is the return on the control portfolio of i over the same period;
nT is the number of stocks at month T;
T i w ,  is the weight of firm (stock) i in event month T;
The null hypothesis of no abnormal buy and hold returns is tested as previously.
However, as Barber, Lyon and Tsai (1998) noted, buy and hold series are highly
skewed so we use an adjusted Student-t statistics.22
4.3. Abnormal returns of SEO firms
The abnormal returns of SEO firms are presented in Table 6. Cumulative
abnormal returns are shown on the left part of the table and buy and hold returns
are on the right.
Table 6 : Long-run performance of SEO firms relative to a size and book-to-market Table 6 : Long-run performance of SEO firms relative to a size and book-to-market
control portfolio control portfolio
Samples Cumulative Abnormal Return Buy and Hold Abnormal Return
6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month
All firms (135)
Equally weighted mean -2.93
 b -1.46 -0.47 1.60 -2.97
 b -1.77 0.97 2.85
t-stat -2.06 -0.72 -0.17 0.46 -2.49 -0.81 0.28 0.62
Value-weighted mean 0.28 -2.15 -1.68 3.03 0.59 -1.96 -1.38 4.89
t-stat 0.26 -1.44 -0.80 1.16 0.59 -1.34 -0.55 1.52
Non parametric median -1.89 -2.59 -0.41 -2.09 -2.99
 b -4.00 -5.49 -6.98
sign test -1.30 -1.30 -0.17 -0.43 -2.19 -1.47 -1.04 -1.13
Non Financial (91)
Equally weighted mean -3.50 -3.13 -3.34 -3.91 -3.48
 b -3.17 -1.17 -1.71
t-stat -1.99 -1.26 -0.94 -0.90 -2.21 -1.08 -0.18 -0.25
Value-weighted mean 3.94
 a -0.38 5.44
 b 8.03
 b 4.45
 a -0.31 7.28
 b 10.64
 b
t-stat 2.94 -0.20 2.02 2.42 2.65 -0.15 2.01 2.41
Non parametric median -1.34 -2.28 -2.47 -4.18 -1.43 -4.14 -7.03 -10.48
sign test -0.74 -1.16 -0.42 -0.96 -0.74 -0.95 -1.28 -1.39
Financial (44)
Equally weighted mean -0.60 2.48 9.01 17.17
 a -0.76 1.67 8.23 14.82
 a
t-stat -0.24 0.71 1.82 2.83 -0.41 0.60 1.63 2.78
Value-weighted mean -0.93 2.25 5.76 16.89
 a -1.01 2.76 5.38 18.69
 a
t-stat -0.44 0.75 1.36 3.26 -0.58 0.98 1.35 3.84
Non parametric median -0.91 0.93 4.70 9.93 -2.28 -0.35 0.84 2.55
sign test -0.61 0.61 0.91 1.55 -1.23 0.00 0.61 0.91
a significant at 1 %
b significant at 5 %.
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, , ,  where T is for 6, 12, 24 and 36 months, RSEO,it is
the return on SEO stock or firm i in event month t, and Rcontrol,it is the return on the control portfolio of i at tth
month after the event.. The average BHAR is calculated as  ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿
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, , , 1 1  where RSEO,it is the
return on stock or firm portfolio i at month tth month after the event, Rcontrol,it is the return of the matched stock
or firm of i at tth month after the event, T is the holding period considered (6, 12, 24 or 36 months) and nT is
the number of the SEO stocks for the T-month period. Equally and value weighted portfolios are constructed.
The t stat for the CAR is computed as in Ritter (1991) as : t stat = ( ) [ ]
2
1
cov 1 2 var ￿ - ￿ + ￿ ￿ t t n CAR t t where t
is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance and cov is the first-order
autocovariance of the ARt series. The t stat is the skewness adjusted t stat suggested in Barber, Lyon and Tsai
(1999) and is calculated as  ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t skew n n skew n stat t stat t ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ + 6 1 3 1
2  where t statt is the t stat value
computed before and skewt is the skewness of the BHAR serie. The sign test is computed as : sign test =
( ) ( ) t t t t n p p p ￿ - ￿ - 1 5 . 0 , where pt is the percentage of positive abnormal returns at month t.23
The general pattern emerging from these preliminary results is radically
different from the one observed in previous studies (see Loughran and Ritter,
1995 and Spiess and Affleck-Grave, 1995). We do not detect an overall negative
abnormal performance for the sample of SEO firms (equally weighted or value-
weighted) at the 36-month horizon. Both the cumulative abnormal returns
abnormal returns and the buy and hold abnormal returns are slightly positive but
not significant at 5%. However, the median is negative and the sign-test rejects
the null hypothesis. When looking at the sub-samples, it comes out that large
firms are likely to generate this positive abnormal performance especially the
financial ones. At shorter horizons, the performance of small SEO firms is similar
to non-SEO firms as abnormal returns are small in magnitude and not significant.
The 6-month horizon is an exception which can be attributed to the bad
performance of small non financial firms. However, the significant abnormal
performance is not persistent across time (and statistical tests). For a specific
sample, having a significant performance according to one criterion does not
imply a significant performance according to others.
4.4. Abnormal returns of SEO stocks
As it is shown in Table 7, the “all stocks” sample do not show any significant
abnormal performance at the 36-month horizon, the median of buy and hold
portfolio being an exception. The results are qualitatively the same as those
obtained previously for the SEO firms. This is because most of the firms issue the
three type of share at the same time.
At the sub-sample level, Bearer shares performance is first negative (significant
at 5%) at the 6-month and 12-month horizons (value-weighted). At the 36-month
horizon, the performance reverts and becomes positive and significant (at 1% for
BHAR and at 5% for CAR) only. Most of the time, the “registered stocks”
sub-sample exhibits a negative (but not significant) CAR.24
Table 7: Long-run performance of SEO stocks relative to a size and book-to-market Table 7: Long-run performance of SEO stocks relative to a size and book-to-market
control portfolio control portfolio
Samples Cumulative Abnormal Return Buy and Hold Abnormal Return
6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month
All stocks (230)
Equally weighted mean -2.43
 b -1.29 -0.11 1.02 -2.59
 b -2.37 -0.12 1.91
t-stat -2.10 -0.79 -0.05 0.35 -2.52 -1.46 -0.02 0.52
Value-weighted mean -0.92 -3.51
 a -4.28
 b -2.93 -0.72 -3.69
 a -5.06
 b -3.50
t-stat -1.12 -3.01 -2.57 -1.42 -0.95 -3.07 -2.54 -1.23
Non parametric median -3.06 -1.55 -1.19 -0.13 -3.16
 b -3.04 -4.59 -7.97
 b
sign test -1.80 -0.66 -0.27 -0.27 -2.48 -1.60 -1.48 -2.19
Bearer (99)
Equally weighted mean -2.26 0.20 0.56 1.04 -2.50 -1.00 2.72 3.79
t-stat -1.29 0.08 0.16 0.23 -1.75 -0.41 0.61 0.73
Value-weighted mean -2.62
 b -3.54
 b -1.54 6.81
 b -2.66
 b -3.61 -0.66 10.05
 a
t-stat -2.11 -2.02 -0.61 2.19 -2.24 -1.89 -0.18 3.03
Non parametric median -3.16 2.89 2.59 3.41 -4.04 -1.83 -2.00 -3.00
sign test -1.32 0.30 1.03 0.62 -1.95 -0.50 -0.41 -0.41
Registered (75)
Equally weighted mean -3.36 -4.06 -2.54 0.53 -3.36
 b -4.97 -3.61 2.78
t-stat -1.65 -1.41 -0.62 0.10 -2.05 -1.95 -0.81 0.44
Value-weighted mean 1.41 -3.15 -2.09 1.60 1.57 -3.54 -4.46 1.63
t-stat 0.93 -1.47 -0.69 0.43 1.03 -1.73 -1.56 0.33
Non parametric median -3.05 -4.86
 a -1.01 -0.51 -3.42 -6.31
 a -5.27 -9.95
sign test -1.05 -3.63 -0.23 -0.47 -1.28 -3.63 -1.66 -0.94
Part. Certif. (56)
Equally weighted mean 2.85 2.50 5.01 7.05 2.85 2.36 3.47 7.84
t-stat 1.23 0.76 1.06 1.19 1.48 0.75 0.73 1.35
Value-weighted mean 2.73 2.98 3.43 4.29 2.70 2.96 4.10 3.83
t-stat 1.40 1.07 0.86 0.86 1.82 1.23 0.87 0.77
Non parametric median 2.72 0.28 5.97 6.47 1.64 -0.70 1.07 1.40
sign test 1.93 0.13 1.25 0.99 1.64 -0.13 0.14 0.42
a significant at 1 %
b significant at 5 %.
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, , , 1 1  where RSEO,it is the
return on stock or firm portfolio i at month tth month after the event, Rcontrol,it is the return of the matched stock
or firm of i at tth month after the event, T is the holding period considered (6, 12, 24 or 36 months) and nT is
the number of the SEO stocks for the T-month period. Equally and value weighted portfolios are constructed.
The t stat for the CAR is computed as in Ritter (1991) as : t stat = ( ) [ ]
2
1
cov 1 2 var ￿ - ￿ + ￿ ￿ t t n CAR t t where t
is the event month, var is the average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance and cov is the first-order
autocovariance of the ARt series. The t stat is the skewness adjusted t stat suggested in Barber, Lyon and Tsai
(1999) and is calculated as  ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t skew n n skew n stat t stat t ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ + 6 1 3 1
2  where t statt is the t stat value
computed before and skewt is the skewness of the BHAR serie. The sign test is computed as : sign test =
( ) ( ) t t t t n p p p ￿ - ￿ - 1 5 . 0 , where pt is the percentage of positive abnormal returns at month t.25
Depending on the test statistics, BHAR are found to be negative in two cases
over twelve. Abnormal returns for the “PC” sample are positive but not
significant with the exception of the value-weighted portfolio. It is surprising to
find a negative performance for registered share, especially in the shorter
horizons.
At the one-year horizon, the three types of securities show differences in the
abnormal stock returns. While Bearer abnormal performance is negative (and
significant), Participation Certificates abnormal performance is positive.
Moreover, at the 6-month horizon, the “all-stocks sample” and the “Bearer” sub-
sample show a negative abnormal performance which is sometimes significant.
Overall, the results show an insignificant performance at 36-month horizon for
SEO firms and SEO stocks. At shorter horizons, the performance is mostly
insignificant but it appears to be significant (positive or negative) depending on
the statistical test, the horizon and the weighting scheme. These finding cast some
doubts on the robustness of the methodology.
5. Are the empirical results robust? 5. Are the empirical results robust?
In order to check the robustness of the results obtained with the control
portfolio method, we perform two more tests based on beta asset pricing models.
The first one is the Fama and French model which has become popular in
estimating the long-run performance. The second one is a conditional CAPM with
time-varying risk premium. It was suggested recently by Ferson and Schadt
(1996) and Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000). The unconditional CAPM may be
view as a restricted version of both models, therefore it is also estimated.
We construct an equally weighted portfolio and a value-weighted portfolio of
SEO firms (stocks) as in Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000). To be more specific,
the value-weighted portfolio consists in investing one Swiss Franc in the first firm26
realising a SEO. After one month the portfolio is rebalanced according to current
market values if and only if additional firms issue securities. A firm is removed
from the portfolio when the third anniversary of the SEO is reached or in case of
delisting; in both cases the portfolio is rebalanced. Portfolios of stocks were
constructed in a similar manner.
5.1 Performance measured with the Fama and French model
According to Fama and French (1993), the expected return of the SEO
portfolio is given by:
(6) ( ) t SEO t SEO t SEO t f t m SEO
FF
SEO t f t SEO HML SMB R R R R , 1 , 2 , , , 1 , , , e b b b a + + + - + = -
where
t SEO R ,  is the monthly return on a portfolio of issuing firms;
t m R , is the return of the Swiss Performance Global Index
9 (SPI Global);
t SMB  is the return on an equally-weighted portfolio of small firms values minus
the return of a portfolio of large firms;
t HML  is the return on an equally-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market value
firms (first 30%) minus the return of an equally-weighted portfolio of low book-
to-market value firms (last 30%).
t SEO, e  is an error term with zero mean and constant variance.
The constant term 
FF
SEO a  in regression (6) is the Jensen’s alpha of the SEO
portfolio. It is an estimate of the monthly average abnormal performance over the
estimation period. However, as advocated by Loughran and Ritter (1999), it
could be the case that the size and the book-to-market factors are contaminated
                                                       
9 It is a value weighted index adjusted for dividend and capital structure operations. Because it exists only since
1984, we have to build it back to 1981.27
by firms involved in SEO. As Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) did, the factors
are recomputed after excluding SEO firms (purged factors).
Table 8 : Abnormal performance computed from the  Table 8 : Abnormal performance computed from the Fama and French model Fama and French model
Firms samples Stocks samples
All
firms
Non Financial Financial All stocks Bearer Registered Part. Certif.
Panel A : equally weighted portfolios
Mean raw returns 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.61 0.68 0.63
Std. Dev. 4.58 5.10 4.69 4.48 4.90 4.17 5.23
Alpha CAPM -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 0.00 -0.03
(-0.37) (-0.15) (0.01) (-0.31) (-1.01) (-0.01) (-0.15)
Alpha FF
Not purged -0.10 -0.10 0.01 -0.08 -0.23 -0.03 -0.07
(-0.73) (-0.53) (0.07) (-0.60) (-1.35) (-0.22) (-0.39)
Purged -0.08 -0.12 0.12 -0.07 -0.22 -0.04 -0.05
(-0.40) (-0.51) (0.51) (-0.40) (-1.00) (-0.21) (-0.21)
Panel B : value weighted portfolios
Mean raw returns 0.91 0.97 0.89 0.88 0.62 1.14 0.45
Std. Dev. 4.69 4.95 5.25 4.69 4.73 4.82 5.60
Alpha CAPM 0.04 0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.21 0.31 -0.27
(0.30) (0.74) (-0.07) (0.10) (-1.24) (1.65) (-1.32)
Alpha FF
Not purged 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.02 -0.21 0.31 -0.27
(0.34) (0.59) (0.05) (0.16) (-1.22) (1.63) (-1.34)
Purged 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.13 -0.11 0.42 -0.14
(1.05) (0.88) (0.74) (0.76) (-0.56) (1.96)
 b (-0.57)
a significant at 1 %
b significant at 5 %.
First, we construct a value-weighted portfolio of SEO firms (stocks) and an equally weighted portfolio. The
value-weighted portfolio consists in investing one Swiss Franc in the first firm realising a SEO. After one
month, the portfolio is rebalanced according to current market values if and only if additional firms issue
securities. A firm is removed from the portfolio when the third anniversary of the SEO is reached or in case of
delisting; in both cases the portfolio is rebalanced. The same method applies to the equally weighted portfolio
except that the same weight is given to every stock at a given date (calendar time).
We estimate the following model:
( ) t SEO t SEO t SEO t f t m SEO
FF
SEO t f t SEO HML SMB R R R R , 1 , 2 , , , 1 , , , e b b b a + + + - + = -
where  t SEO R ,  is the portfolio return of SEO firms (stocks),  t f R ,  is the risk-free rate (one-month Euro CHF),
FF
SEO a is the Jensen’s alpha (the performance);  t m R , is the market return (SPI index);  t SMB  is the return on an
equally-weighted portfolio of small firms values minus the return of a portfolio of large firms; t HML  is the
return on an equally-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market value firms (first 30%) minus the return of an
equally-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market value firms (last 30%). We also estimate the performance
with the CAPM (nested model). The results (in %) are presented for both the standard factors and the purged
factors. In that case, the market index and the factors are computed after the exclusion of SEO firms (stocks).
The coefficients are estimated by OLS and reported t-stat (in parenthesis) are the heteroscedasticity consistent28
White (1980) estimates. As we focus on the performance, we do not report beta estimates. However, they are
available upon request from the authors.
The results presented in Table 8 show that, with the exception of the registered
shares value-weighted portfolio, we do not have underperformance or
overperformance anymore. Moreover, they are also insensitive for both the firm
sample and sub-sample as well as from the stock sample and sub-samples. The
CAPM leads to the same qualitative results except. As under the null, all the
models are expected to give similar conclusions, this is not a surprise. However,
as discussed by Loughran and Ritter (1999), it could be the case that these
models lack power in detecting abnormal performance.
5.2. Performance measured with a conditional CAPM
In the presence of time–varying expected returns a conditional Jensen’s alpha
is more appropriate in order to estimate the abnormal performance (see Ferson
and Schadt, 1996 and Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2000 for instance). The message
from previous studies which aim to explain the time-varying risk premium in
Switzerland is mixed. Solnik (1993), Bossaerts and Hillion (1998) and Oertman
(1998) find that standard lagged instruments like the short term interest rate, the
long term interest rate, the dividend yield, the price to earnings and the lagged
value of the risk premium itself have a low explanatory power (adjusted 
2 R  are
equal or less than 3%). Moreover, the instruments are rarely individually
significant. On the other hand, Clerc and Gibson (1999) find the change in the
one month Euro CHF rate and the lagged value of the Financial
Times/Standard&Poor’s World Index excess return to play a significant role in
explaining the Swiss risk premium at the weekly level. As there is no precise
guideline for the Swiss market concerning the model to estimate, we restrict
ourselves to a conditional CAPM with time-varying beta as defined in Ferson and
Schadt (1996, p. 430 eq.4):29
(7) t SEO t m t t m
Cond
SEO t SEO u r r r , , 1
'
1 , 0 , + + + = - z d d d a
where
r is the return in excess of the risk free rate;
0 d  is the unconditional beta;
'
1 d d  is a vector with dimension equal to the dimension of  1 - t Z ;
( ) Z Z z E t t - = - - 1 1  is the vector of instruments (centred) that investors use to form
expectations;
t SEO u ,  is an error term with zero mean and constant variance.
The regression model in equation (7) and in particular the Jensen’s alpha (
Cond
SEO a )
are estimated by OLS.
In this study we retain the standard instruments. However, we explored other
instruments and find the spread between Swiss long term government bonds and
Swiss long term corporate bonds (Pictet Index) to be the unique significant
variable among the standard type of instruments used in previous studies. As the
choice of the relevant instruments is not the topic of this research, we do not
present the results
10. The performance of our SEO portfolio is estimated with two
different models. The first one uses the same instruments as in Clerc and Gibson
and the second one, the spread between government and corporate bonds
11.
The empirical results are presented in Table 9. Samples and sub-samples
deliver the same message. Neither under-performance nor over-performance is
observed after a SEO with a time-varying beta CAPM. Nevertheless, the
Registered shares value-weighted portfolio, albeit insignificant at 5%, has a high
Student-t.
                                                       
10 They are available from the authors upon request.
11 The series are collected from Datastream30
Table 9 : Abnormal performance estimated from a time-varying beta CAPM Table 9 : Abnormal performance estimated from a time-varying beta CAPM
Firms samples Stocks samples
All
firms
Non Financial Financial All stocks Bearer Registered Part. Certif.
Panel A : equally weighted portfolios
Model 1 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.03
(0.46) (0.39) (0.82) (0.54) (-0.22) (0.59) (0.15)
Model 2 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.12 0.05 0.13
(0.06) (0.27) (0.07) (0.19) (-0.61) (0.27) (0.64)
Panel B : value weighted portfolios
Model 1 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.30 -0.17
(1.36) (1.53) (0.49) (1.12) (-0.06) (1.93) (-0.89)
Model 2 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.05 -0.19 0.32 -0.16
(0.61) (0.90) (-0.02) (0.44) (-1.17) (1.95) (-0.82)
a significant at 1 %
b significant at 5 %.
First, we construct a value-weighted portfolio of SEO firms (stocks) and an equally weighted portfolio as
before. Second, we estimate the following model:
t SEO t m t t m
Cond
SEO t SEO u r r r , , 1
'
1 , 0 , + + + = - z d d d a
where r is the return in excess of the risk free rate;  0 d  is the unconditional beta; 
'
1 d d  is a vector with
dimension equal to the number of instruments;  1 - t z  is the vector of instruments (centred) used by investors to
form expectations. Two different models are estimated. For the first model, the set of instruments consists in
the MSCI index and the first difference between the one-month Euro rate both with one lag. In the second
model, we have one instrument defined as the spread between long term government bonds and long term
corporate bonds (Pictet Index). The coefficients are estimated by OLS and reported t-stat (in parenthesis) are
the heteroscedasticity consistent White (1980) estimates. As we focus on the performance, we do not report beta
estimates. However, they are available upon request from the authors.
A closer look at the performance of the control portfolio
12 shows that there is
some mismatching for the Registered shares. Our main conclusion is that, as
shown recently by Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000), the general performance of a
SEO portfolio is insignificant. However, one last characteristic of Swiss issuers
has to be analysed: the high issuing frequency.
5.3. High issuance and personal taxes on dividends
Even if we do not find any persistent abnormal performance for the Swiss SEO
stocks or firms, the frequency of firms to issue equity is puzzling. As we
                                                       
12 To estimate the bias introduced by taking a matching portfolio instead of beta-pricing model, we construct
the following portfolio: invest 1 CHF long in the SEO portfolio and 1 CHF short in the control portfolio. The
Jensen’s alpha is estimated as previously. In order to save space, the results are not presented but they are
available from the authors upon request.31
mentioned in section 2, before the introduction of the new Corporate Law in July
1992, stock dividend was taxed as cash dividend although capital gains were free
of taxes for private investors. When we look at the evolution of the SEOs over
the whole period
13, we observe that 1992 constitutes a breakpoint in the issuing
policy of Swiss firms (see Figure 1).
Figure 1:Evolution of the  Figure 1:Evolution of the SEOs through time SEOs through time
All the main characteristics of the offerings are altered. First, the annual
number of SEOs decreases dramatically from over 20 to less than 10 (the thick
line in Figure 1). Second, the median size of the issues increases strongly (the thin
line in Figure 1). It denotes a change in the motives of the firm to raise equity.
This fact is underlined by the drop of the right-to-price ratio after 1992 (the
dotted line in Figure 1).
                                                       
13 Swiss practitioners generally agree that the offering price should not exceed 2/3 of the pre-SEO market price
and that the value of the right should be equal to at least twice the dividend. These considerations are
confirmed by the data. However, these figures could change due to market conditions (bullish or bearish) and to




















































































The right-to-price ratio corresponds to the value of the subscription right
14
divided by the market price of the stock. It measures the impact of the offering on
the stock price and it can be viewed as a proxy for the issuing price discount.
Therefore, a SEO with a large discount on the issuing price can be used to
replicate a stock dividend distribution. We call it a “quasi” SEO, opposite to a
“real” SEO that is done for a financing reason. Furthermore, a “quasi” SEO has
another advantage to stock dividend because it allows the shareholder to manage
the kind of remuneration he wants to benefit from. For instance, a shareholder can
behave in three different manners when an offering occurs. First, he can invest in
the issue and buy the new shares at a discount price. This action causes him a
negative cash flow but it increases the number of stocks in his portfolio. Second,
he can target a zero net cash flow by selling a part of his subscription rights and
investing the proceed in the issue (zero investment strategy). These strategies are
tax neutral for a private investor or a pension fund. Finally, he can sell the
subscription rights and ends up with a positive cash flow. In the last case, the
SEO can be assimilated to a tax free cash distribution. The dividend yield of the
stocks in our sample appears to be quite low (2.11%). Over the same period and
depending on the country, the dividend yield was between 3% to 4% in Europe
and the USA. If we consider the right as a method to pay cash , our conclusions
change dramatically. The modified dividend yield (dividend plus right) is equal to
3.80% which is in accordance to international standards. To conclude, the high
frequency issuance had at least two purposes. First, it was designed to circumvent
the very restrictive Corporate Law prevailing before 1992. Second, it was used
reduced the very unattractive cash payments compared to the non-taxed capital
gains.
                                                       





=  where N is the number of
outstanding shares before the issue, n is the number of the offered shares, BP is the stock price before the33
6. Conclusion 6. Conclusion
After analysing the Swiss seasoned equity offering process, we outline several
security types, high issuing frequency and small size offerings as its main
characteristics. The more used issuing process is the offering with subscription
rights. From the initial 358 operations on stocks, we form one “all stocks” non-
overlapping sample, three sub-samples according to security types and four sub-
samples according to firm activity. We also work at a firm level (231 firms
offerings were considered). For that we build for each firm a value-weighted
portfolio with its different security types. Then, we form three different sample
and sub-samples (one “all firms” and two according to firm activity). For each
sample, we compute the abnormal performance after a 6, 12 24 and 36-month
horizon using the cumulative abnormal return and the buy and hold abnormal
return. We select a control portfolio based on size and book-to-market as
benchmark.
Unlike what is obtained on the US market, Swiss stocks and firms do not show
significant abnormal performance over a 36-month horizon after a seasoned
equity offering. However, some sub-samples, and only for isolated time horizons,
exhibit either positive or negative abnormal performance. Most of them are found
after the 6-month horizon. On average, 55 % of the stocks have a negative
abnormal performance which is less than what is found in the previous studies.
We add new evidence that Seasoned Equity Offerings do not necessarily lead to
long-run abnormal performance (see Brav et al., 1998; Eckbo et al., 1998;
Michtell and Stafford, 1998).
Swiss firms are involved in a SEO process with an unexpected high frequency
compared to international standards. We explain the high issuing frequency of
some firms by the fact that their "quasi SEOs" allowed them to pay tax free cash
                                                                                                                                                                            
subscription right trading period and IP is the offering price.34
dividends. However, since July 1992 stock dividends are not taxed as cash
dividends, consequently the number of offerings has strongly decreased.
This study can be further developed in analysing the long-run stock
performance after SEOs made on other European markets (France and Germany
for instance). These markets are at the same time close to the Swiss market
(Germany) and rather different (France). Nevertheless, they share the same
method of issuing new equity, i.e. SEO with rights. German tax law can influence
the motivation for a firm to issue new equity in a different manner than in
Switzerland. However, French firms issuing policy is not subject to any tax law
influence and stock splits limitation. This is precisely what precludes a joint study
of the seasoned equity process in continental Europe markets. Anyway, both
markets are very different from the US market and from each other. This is why
they are of great interest in testing theories of capital structure.35
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